A methodological problem
The view that religion is of an ambivalent nature, that it has a double cultural existence, that the feelings connected with religious experience are correspondingly ambivalent, is shared by certain classic, modern, and post-modern thinkers, like Schleiermacher, Kant, the early Hegel, Henri Bergson, Kierkegaard, Tillich, Fromm, etc. These authors have referred to two kinds of religion, each of which has a separate definition: traditional, authoritarian, communal on the one hand, and personal, exalted, mystical on the other. The two types also have different bearers: the people, the group, the community for the first, and the religious virtuoso, the person with an "ear" for religion, the Romantic, the mystic for the latter. Each type is related to a predominant type of experience and satisfies specific needs. The first type of religion, according to these authors, is connected with negative emotions and illusory means of overcoming them: the feeling of fear, dependence, limitation, subordination, and submission. The second type is connected with positive emotions: love, freedom, faith in one's own force. The first type corresponds to bureaucratic ecclesiastic institutions, to a system of dogma, and ritualized collective action; the second, to ecstasy and spiritual enthusiasm, to vibrant and captivating prophetic speech.
The deepest philosophical premises for this view of religion in terms of ambivalent cultural opposition, are certain fundamental anthropological antinomies that problematize the conditions and emergence of human nature and vitality: essence and existence, the individual and the social aspects, the creative and the routine aspects of human life, authoritarianism and freedom.
Unfortunately the term "religion" is often employed without preliminary discussion of the contents of religiousness and without the necessary distinction between it and its social uses as a motivation, emblem and an emotional mobilizing factor in conflict situations, as a form of secondary and arbitrary sacralization of various associations and human activities. In such cases the external and formal marks of the religious, such as affiliation, delimitation from others, identification with a territory and community, are put to functional use; the contents of religion that once determined its origin, such as adhering to a certain ethos and observing a specific moral code (particularly characteristic of Christianity) remain in the background.
Both on the individual and social plan, the orientation of the transcending, universalizing power of religion could vary depending on the macro-social movements a community (respectively, an individual) is involved. For the individual as for the community, religion could be a cultural position transcending ego-and ethno-centrism, mono-cultural tendencies -at the initial stage of development of world religions, in the historical periods of formation of macro-social, cross-cultural entities. In situations of internal differentiation and disintegration of these entities, the universalizing, binding role of religion is partialized and determined by various social groups, who are often in opposition to each other due to their economic, political, ethnic, psychological features. Being an idea, rituality, feeling that internally integrates the group, partialized religion (respectively modified in dogmatic and institutional terms) becomes a spiritual force that often counters the other, the alien, supporting the practices of the confrontation.
This process is usually related to the invalidation of universally uniting religious-moral bonds and values and intensification of differences: power, property, doctrinal differences; to a shift of the weight center from internal spiritual movements (particularly typical of mysticism, asceticism, priesthood) on to practical social actionreformist heresies, the various practical theologies of revolution, liberation, the religious-motivated wars.
Despite the fact that, following its abstract definition, religion could be defined as a universal phenomenon, in reality it remains closely connected with the various forms of human communal co-existence -the family, the tribe, the state, the empire, the civilization. The universal religious community which connects the Christians (Ecclesia), or the Muslims (Umma) remains an imaginary concept, or, rather, a spiritual construct normally deprived of any social and normative validity. This contradiction between the universalistic spirit and doctrine of these world religions and their local connection with concrete human communities, according to certain authors, proves fatal for the cultural status of religion, making it a victim of rivalry and aggression. Considering another point of view, each particular type of religion and the religious controversies, draw the dividing line between the separate human communities -groups, nations, types of ethnicity, civilizations. These theoretical problems have been widely discussed both in terms of the philosophy and sociology of religion. Since the Enlightenment onwards, together with the decreased influence of the religion and of the Church, there has been a clear tendency for religion to be interpreted as a part of the structure and functions of the social system: as its organic element or a subsystem (Weber, Durkheim), as subordinated to the moral sphere (Kant), as a sub-stage in the self-evolution of the Absolute Mind (Hegel), as a form of individual and social alienation (Foyerbach, Marx), as a "ton" of the social communication (Simmel), etc.
Religion and the social context
The qualitative changes that have taken effect on Christianity as a faith and institution, both in the West and East, during the second half of the 20 th century have shown that the Christianity has become more dependent on and reactionary connected to the fundamental cultural specificity of the particular society in which it exists. Socio-cultural peculiarities of that society such as: the degree of evolution of the individual element, rationality and openness of the institutions and social relations, and the types of political and social system, are the factors which the role of religion in society and its doctrinal and institutional transformations depend upon.
As a researcher has put it, the most prominent topic throughout the above discussed deals with the different uses of the absolute religious definitions, which the whole humankind should be able to access (God, eternity, divinity) , and their subordination to various private or temporary aims and communities. The embodied Absolute acquires historical, geographical and communal forms and definitions. Thus it has turned from a unifying into a dividing force.
The differentiation of monotheistic religions, particularly of Islam and Christianity (with its confessional divisions into Catholicism, Protestantism, Eastern Orthodoxy) is a process in which the absolute is linked with relative determinations: with concrete communities, territories, cultures. This tendency has at least two very important consequences: 1) the erosion of the image of God as an absolute, as a transcendent reality; the striving of each religion to revive his sacral status through a specific form of universalization, a particular monopoly on him, and 2) the inclusion of religious faith and experience in the complex social texture of needs, passions, community identities pertaining to particular empires, states, nations, ethnic groups, civilizations, classes.
The divided God has lost his sacral, absolute immunity and is drawn into involvement as a collaborator and participant in various human enterprises, strivings, yearnings. I see this tendency as reflecting the essence of the much debated process (notion) of secularization. Understood in this way, secularization is a tendency evident even in Islamic countries, where religion is increasingly connected with political, national, social projects and interests.
When reduced to an ethnic, political, or state emblem, religious affiliation to Judaism, Islam, Orthodoxy, Catholicism, Protestantism have become and still are tools for the sacralization of military and political conflicts. In religion-motivated conflict situations, opposing parties de-sacralize their Sacred Books as their acts contradict the books' moral content.
The ethos of major religions, presented in their Sacred Books (particularly in Christianity and Islam) is mostly linked to ideas and recommendations that support humility, patience, non-resistance, love for one's fellow men, especially the weak and poor. The Bible promotes love for one's fellow men, one's enemies included, as a supreme Christian value (Apostle Paul). In the Koran, the poor, weak and suffering enjoy particular care and respect. At the same time, it is repeatedly pointed out that national, ethnic and sex differences cannot be a ground for division and opposition wherever people are united by the same creed -Christian or Muslim. Of course, this does not mean that Sacred Texts do not contain other accents that render absolute the rightness of one's own faith, drawing a line of division between virtuous and sinful, expecting the latter to be punished, etc. But the first line -that of humility and patience -is stronger and brighter, and it determines the emphases in the moral consciousness of the religions in question. The issue of punishment and violence is left at the disposal of the supreme force and is usually expected beyond earthly time and history.
For early Christianity the moral commitment was of paramount importance. The specific features of the Christian ethos then was acceptance of suffering, non-resistance to evil, resignation, humility, leaving it to God to mete justice, etc., all of which are incompatible with violence over others. In modern times the cultural area of this type of morality has been severely reduced. The cult of human activeness, the implementation of control mechanisms and regulations in all spheres of activity, the emphasis on the present, are all modern values which have gradually turned Christian morality into a marginal, rarely encountered phenomenon. I feel that this is largely true for all modernizing countries regardless of the religions prevailing in them. Thus the type of Christian morality is rather a question of personal character and choice than a matter of social culture. This type of morality is not amenable to group regulation and mobilization, for it implies both a certain type of behaviour and a corresponding motivation and feeling. This personal spiritual commitment of the doer is lacking in the completely regulated culture of modern times.
Religion becomes a vital element of a national, ethnic, in general, group, community ideology only when it becomes immediately tied and subordinated to the cultural, political, etc. reproduction of the respective community. When it is absorbed into group mythology. One of its essential functions in the process of its instrumentalization is to provide the basis for the ontological status of the group, for its right on autonomous existence on the one hand, and, on the other hand, for its superiority, its authority over and above other communities of its kind . This usage of religion is particularly intensive when the group inhabits an environment with a different religious affiliation. When, due to whatever historical circumstances, this environment has been for a long time or has become hostile to the existence and preservation of the group the religious differences of the conflicting parties become a durable element of their aggressive and defensive strategies.
Mechanisms of instrumentalization are usually connected with:
1) A doctrinal reductionism with respect to the particular religion. Group mythology eliminates the universalist, general human appeal of religion (each historical religion contains such an appeal) and ties it above all to its own origin and heroic past; it sacralizes its own territory and temporal continuity drawing from it energies for its future.
2) A second characteristic mechanism for the instrumentalization of religion as a foundation of group identity is the shift of accent from its moral and spiritual value for the individual to its group-symbolic functions.
3) A third main mechanism of group instrumentalization of religion is activist mobilisation, transformation of religious doctrine. Aggressive strategy of the group is often connected with it. In historical religions patience, non-resistance, spiritual surpassing of suffering is in the focus of attention. Privatised by an ethnos, a nation or other kind of group, religion is grounding an activist manifestation of the group.
3. Notes on history and the historical background of the myth of "God's elect" nation
The belief that every community has it own divinity (its totem in the terms of archaic religion), which protects, shields and unites it, is an inseparable element of the religious complex of all ancient tribal religions. The function of the bond between the community and its specific divinity is related to: 1) establishing and sacralizing the boundaries of the respective territory and the social unit; 2) symbolizing, objectifying tribal unity and identity; 3) distinguishing the community as a specific, autonomous group from neighbouring groups that compete for territory and resources; 4) inspiring a feeling of security and protection against the natural elements and dangers of the environment; 5) bestowing sacred status on the leader as a center and personification of these functions.
An important moment in the cultural evolution of the idea of the sacred bond between the group and the divinity is the emergence of the great historical religions and the Biblical idea of God's elect people, Israel. Set down as part of the holy book of Christendom, this idea still forms an explosive synthesis of political ideology and military force (as evident in the Near East conflict).
As an element of the Bible, the idea of God's elect nation and the nation's God-chosen leader (almost a god himself) goes beyond the initial national, local connotations and gradually accumulates a universalistic potential, serving as an ideal core, a universal matrix which fuels with idealistic and emotional energy the national mythologies of separate peoples converted to Christianity. But this concept sets cultural grounds or rather produces a pretext for interna-tional rivalry over the "private ownership" of the Christian God. In the Middle Ages a large part of the international relations in the Balkans, (wars, diplomatic maneuvers, political rivalry) developed under the banner of this "nationalization", this "privatization" of divine protection and preference. Of course, this was not the only nor the basic function of Christianity in this period and in this region. The lofty moral, cultural, spiritual dimensions, the humane potential of this religion are well known. The possibility for Christianity to assume the status of a national, state, and imperial political religion derive from the ambivalence in its ideal contents and the varying social "physical condition" (G. Simmel) that it is exists in. This social condition may be one of two basic kinds: 1) a type of morality related to interpersonal relationships and the sacralizing values of humility, patience, love, which surmount the boundaries, languages, and cultures that divide people (St. Paul); 2) as a social (state, ethnic, national) ideology and mythology that sanctifies community identitycommunity borderlines, history, language, culture -and the unique mission of the community; in this community mythology, based on the religious idea of what is "ours", the boundaries of "ours" are usually clearly defined, so that "ours" is perceived as superior and opposed to the others, to the alien.
Such a process can be observed in the histories of all Balkan nations converted to Christianity. I should make a preliminary specification: the instrumental use of Christianity in its "physical condition" of a political religion and an ideal core of political mythology, is not based only on the ideological ambivalence of the ideas contained in this religion. The determining factor lies elsewhere: it consists in the various national and historical needs of states, empires, ethnic groups to sanctify, to find a transcendent foundation for offensive or defensive forms of furthering their separate interests in the struggle to impose or protect their "own" against the "alien". Our "own" may assume different forms according to the shape or pretensions of the alien; it could be perceived in terms of territory, material resources, or mythological symbolism, of the "true faith", or other attributes of collective identity. The myth of God's elect, personified by the divinely chosen leader, provides sacred foundations and powerful emotional energy for defending or proving the superiority of one's own community, a process that usually demands bloody sacrifices.
Repetition and modernization of the "Religion-national mythology" synthesis
The power of historical mythologies is in reverse proportion to the capacity of a nation to periodically renew its social life worldits psychological attitudes, labour relations, political stereotypes; in A. Toynbee's words, this is the capacity to respond to external and internal challenges by using a nation's inner resources, and not by warring with near and distant nations. I will apply Toynbee's ideas to make one other argument. The political elite bears a particularly great responsibility for maintaining the typical inertia of mythological archetypes in the collective consciousness. In the modern history of the countries in the Balkan region the national elites have, with few exceptions, followed rather than critically overcome these stereotypes. Moreover, in the post-totalitarian period, using the capacity of modern propaganda, most of these elites have stirred up and enervated these stereotypes, bringing them to dangerous extremes.
The reverses of fortune in the political destinies of nations have been dramatic in these regions: Ottoman domination destroyed the official statehood and official cultural spheres of the peoples; the opening of the countries to various spiritual, economic, ideological influences after the creation in the 19 th century of the national states in the Balkans; the creation of the Yugoslav Federation (1918), and of the "Socialist bloc" in the 1940s, etc. In parallel with these transformations, the myth of a unifying and dominant political and spiritual center that would transcend and envelop the separate states (which is the prototype of the "God's elect" myth) continues to exist although with a new ideological content. Together with the idea of an Orthodox religious community (gradually laid aside in modern times), this alliance, this federation of countries is increasingly seeking grounds in the Slavic ethnic element or rather with compact parts of this element, i.e. the Southern Slavs and the Eastern Slavs. The core of the myth -the religious belief in "God's elect" -has been replaced by a Slavic ethnocentric idea. This modernization of the mythological matrix is based on the higher capacity for unification that the ethnic concept offers in modern times. The ethnic idea justifies the greater integrating vocation of the central state, which has assumed the mission of unifier on the basis of this idea; the state is thus justified in forming a contemporary oikoumenos, a commonwealth of neighbouring countries that differ in language and religion, but live in similar social-economic conditions. The communist idea, which is placed at the core of the myth of a nation with a unique historical mission (in this case Soviet Russia) transcends the religious and ethnic boundaries of the nations it unites, and justifies the inclusion into the "commonwealth" of a variety of nations and cultures.
It is quite clear and widely accepted that in modern Balkan history the myth of the unique mission of state and nation, for the monopoly of which Balkan states still compete, is increasingly becoming a tool for the realization of the separate interests of the rival states, including territorial, economic and national-identity interests. The mythological archetype of the state and national mission is increasingly becoming the object of political manipulation. The political elite uses its mobilizing capacity in ways that seem to best suit the occasion. In most cases (in keeping with the inertia of the initial archetype), the myth is used for offense or defense, for imposing or protecting "one's own". More rarely it is used for internal cultural and economic development and growth that will free the respective country of fear of aggressive intentions. The mythological form has the capacity of unifying masses and elite (especially the people and its leader), of turning them into a united emotional community. In this union of people and leader, a mystic alliance prevails through the revived collective memories, through passions, impulses, irrational thinking and behaviour. Legitimacy, contract relations, rational-pragmatic and clearly formulated responsibilities and expectations are replaced by piety, by power charisma (M. Weber).
Ambivalence and vitality of the mythological form: causes and consequences
We hardly need to prove the strong motivating force of such a synthesis, which recurs even in post-modern times and not only in the Balkans. I should specify that the myth of "God's elect", of the nation's mission, and historical mythology in general have an ambivalent cultural potential. Which particular possibility will be materialized, whether the myth will be used as a source of energy for positive internal development of the state or for aggression and military action abroad, will entirely depend on the political maturity and culture of the respective nation and particularly on its political and intellectual elite. That is why I believe the term used by the Bulgarian historian M. Lalkov is particularly suitable -he refers to a useful history and mythology, meaning a kind of usage of historical mythological material that depends not only on traditions but on a people's vital force for construction and renewal.
The dangerous form of use of historical myths and particularly of the myth of uniqueness, of an important mission (linguistic, religious, ethnic) in modern and recent history of most Balkan nations is one of the ideological causes for the military and cultural rivalry between them. The actual cultural-historical causes for this are a result of the limited resources, of the complex interweaving and small differences with regard to language, religion, ethnic background between the peoples and states in this region; these facts have been discussed by many authors. Nevertheless, all these causes are centered around the as yet incomplete individualities of these states, in their insufficient self-confidence and awareness of how states can function effectively in our times. National identities are still upheld through pre-modern forms of group affiliation, formed in the past and fixed in tradition. The past, national belonging, origin, tradition, territory are all key terms of pre-modern historical frameworks that limit action and personal fulfilment. In cultures where these factors predominate, the past prevails over the present; tradition, over renewal; affiliation, over free self-expression; memories, over productive action; destruction, over constructiveness. In these types of states and cultures the unique mission and significance is not a result of the united productive energies of autonomous individuals but of collective historical memories and passions, which are not capable of sweeping away all attempts at independent thinking and behaviour.
The supporting structure of this type of domination of collective memory or mythology over individual reflection and action is specific to Balkan societies and culture: it consists in the collectivist fabric of these societies and the weakness of autonomous individualism, a situation that emerging Western capitalism overcame centuries ago. These collectivist forms and attitudes were additionally fixed during the time of totalitarianism. Of course, this is not to say that this kind of mentality and social behaviour is typical for all periods and all countries of the Balkans to an equal degree. Moreover, these defense mechanisms of identity and the idea of a national mission have been and still are practiced at times in certain places even in Western countries. The myth of a God-chosen center with a unique universalistic mission, in its secular form, has also been used in the 20 th century in developed Western states and is currently being used by the US. The consequences of this modern usage of the archaic myth are far more important and, in some cases, destructive than so-called "Balkanization".
Such situations are not an exclusive regional characteristic of Balkan societies, of the Balkan national character. They exist actually or potentially among quite a few peoples, cultures, including highly developed ones in respect to economy and technology. What then are the local causes for actualizing this common potential, for activating the historical myth of the mission of an exceptional community (even in its outdated form) as a means for defense and aggression against foreigners? One of the most important ones is the domination of collectivist attitudes, which narrow down the field of innovational self-expression of individuals in relations of creative work, politics, and in interpersonal relationships. These attitudes seem to be a particularly strong obstacle in cases when the old forms and relationships have exhausted their potential, while the emergence of new forms requires a life space, a Lebensraum for independent, courageous, free individuals; when such individuals fail to produce the creative force of new social forms, the latter become the product of the collectivist forces.
In fact totalitarianism, fascism, dictatorship are a specific "creation" of collectivist forces personified and then manipulated by the so-called elite (Arendt, etc.) . This lack of free space for self-fulfilment (not in terms of territory but as a social characteristic of the community) of individual creative energy is the deep cause of the crisis. This unconscious or conscious thwarting of the nation's creative energy creates a general feeling of crisis, of breakdown, of destruction, not of construction of a living world. As philosophers of history say, society then enters a period of changes, a situation in which various options are possible. The activation of historical mythology and especially of the myth of the nation's mission, its exceptionality and divine election, are a sure sign of the collectivist-traditional form of compensating for thwarted social growth. The presence of myth shows that society has chosen the well-used past means of defense and aggression, of opposition between "ours" and "other's" , of charismatic submission to power and to the "leader". Society has thereby chosen to look upon Lebensraum as a cleansing of all elements that are not part of God's elect people. This Lebensraum has archaic connotations: territory, language, religion, mythology. The process can be stopped and reoriented only by a political elite that well knows the power of the trend, but finds it dangerous rather than useful and has understanding and vision with regard to a modern national strategy. Unfortunately, during most of their history most Balkan peoples have not succeeded in producing such an elite. The causes for this failure are various and have been sufficiently studied. In the rest of the world as well, it is rare for the elite to surpass the political maturity of its people. There is usually some degree of correspondence, as Plato remarked.
In the present-day situation in the Balkans, we observed that the elite regards collectivist attitudes and historical mythologies as a useful opportunity, as a source of power, as a cultural tool devised by ancestors and ready for use when polished and sharpened by propaganda.
The historical myth of superiority, of divine election, and the mission of "our community" throws a "sacred canopy" (P. Berger's term) over tradition, religion, morals. It is not the myth that brings forth the elemental energy of the people, but the energy that exploits the myth. And this is true, whether the myth of the mission be revived by poetry and historical romanticism or by metaphysical philosophers, by refined theologians or by mediums. In this type of situation, religion is usually reduced to "belonging", as G.Davie put it, (a striking symbol of difference and alien nature -ethnic, linguistic, psychological), at the expense of "believing" and a corresponding moral behavior. The religious universe becomes thus subordinated to partial group values, instead of standing above them.
*
It was probably in consideration of this wide range of "faces" of religious phenomenon, of the understanding of the very concept of religion, that the German philosopher and sociologist Georg Simmel (1858 Simmel ( -1918 wrote: "The sources and essence of religion are concealed in a deceitful semi-obscurity. Things do not become any clearer, if, as earlier, no more than a single problem is perceived here, requiring a single solution. Today, no one has succeeded in proposing a definition of religion that be not vague and imprecise, yet that encompass all the phenomena and tell us what religion is… religion is not clearly distinguished, on the one hand, from metaphysical speculation and, on the other, from faith in providence… The indefinite essence of religion corresponds to the multiple psychological motives that are recognized to be its sources". Nonka Bogomilova FILOZOFSKI PRISTUP SINTEZI "RELIGIJA -NACIONALNA MITOLOGIJA" Rezime Ovaj tekst analizira filozofske aspekte sinteze "religija -nacionalna ideologija". Sledeaei su glavni pravci studije: 1. I na individualnom i na društvenom planu, usmerenje na transcendiranju, univerzalizaciji moaei religije mo e varirati u zavisnosti od makrosocijalnih kretanja zajednice (ili pojedinca) koji je u njih ukljuèen. Kako za pojedinca tako i za zajednicu, religija bi mogla biti kulturno stanovište koje transcendira egocentrizam i etnocentrizam, kao i monokulturna kretanja; u situacijama unutrašnjih raslojavanja i dezintegracije tih entiteta, univerzalizujuaea uloga religije je parcijalizovana i odreðena od razlièitih društvenih grupa koje èesto stoje nasuprot jedna drugoj zbog njihovih politièkih, ekonomskih, etnièkih i psiholoških osobina. 2. Taj je proces obièno povezan s obezvreðivanjem univerzalno ujedinjujuaeih religijsko-moralnih vrednosti i intenziviranjem razlika: moae, svojina, doktrinalne razlike; 3. Kada su svedeni na etnièke, politièke ili dr avne simbole, religiozna pripadnost judaizmu, islamu, pravoslavlju, katolièanstvu, protestantizmu postaje i ostaje sredstvo za sakralizaciju vojnih i politièkih sukoba. U situacijama sukoba koji religijski motivisani, protivnièke strane desakralizuju svete knjige druge strane kako njihova dela protivreèe moralnom sadr aju tih knjiga. 4. Moae istorijskih mitologija je u obrnutoj srazmeri sa sposobnošaeu nacije da periodièno obnovi svoj društveni svet ivota -svoja psihološka dr anja, radne odnose, politièke stereotipe. 5. U situaciji tog tipa, religija je obièno svedena na "pripadništvo", kako na to ukazuje G. Dejvi, nauštrb "verovanja" i odgovarajuaeeg moralnog ponašanja.
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